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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
Cross-Appellant,
Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 88-0201
UTAH STATE BAR and
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON,
Defendants
Appellants,
Cross-Respondents

BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT
and RESPONDENT

THE PLAINTIFF, CROSS-APPELLANT and RESPONDENT, BRIAN M.
BARNARD, by and through his counsel, the UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
through C. Dane Nolan and Brian M. Barnard, submits the
following BRIEF in support of his cross-appeal and in
response to the appellate brief of the defendants STEPHEN
HUTCHINSON and the UTAH STATE BAR.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction in this court is based upon Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2 (3) (1953 as amended).
The trial court resolved the matter by a summary
judgment dated May 9, 1988 in favor of the plaintiff.
Appendix)

(See

Defendants1 notice of appeal and plaintiff's

notice of cross-appeal were both dated and filed May 18,
1988.

(See Appendix)

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is a cross-appeal from a decision by the Hon.
Homer Wilkinson of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County, Utah, granting declaratory and injunctive
relief to the plaintiff under the Archives and Records
Services and Information Practices Act, Ut. Code Ann.
§§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended), and the Utah Public and
Private Writings Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-26-2 et seq (1953
as amended), but denying attorney fees and denying exemplary
damages.
Defendants appealed from the granting of relief and the
order requiring compliance and disclosure under the applicable statutes.
Plaintiff has cross-appealed the denial of attorney
fees and exemplary damages.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

(1) The application of the Archives and
Records Services and Information Practices
Act (Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as
amended)) to the UTAH STATE BAR.
(2) The application of the Public and
Private Writings Act (Ut. Code Ann. §§78-26-1
et seq (1953 as amended)) to the UTAH STATE
BAR.
(3) Awards of attorney fees under the
Archives and Records Services and Information
Practices Act (Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et
seq (1953 as amended)).
(4) Awards of exemplary damages under
the Archives and Records Services and Information Practices Act (Ut. Code Ann. §§
63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended)).
(5) Application of Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS

The controlling statutes are the Archives and Records
Services and Information Practices Act, Ut. Code Ann.
§§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended), and the Public and
Private Writings Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-26-1 et seq (1953
as amended), as interpreted by Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d
1193 (Utah 1980).
The issue of attorney fees is addressed by Ut. Code
Ann. § 63-2-88 (1) (1953 as amended).

The issue of exempla-

ry damages is addressed by Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (2) (1953
as amended).
The UTAH STATE BAR was created in 1931 by state law,
Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-51-1 et seq. (1953 as amended), and
perpetuated and re-created in 1981 by this Court (Rules for
Integration and Management of the UTAH STATE BAR, adopted by
the Utah Supreme Court, effective July 1, 1981).
The Rules and Regulations of the UTAH STATE BAR, as
adopted and approved by this Court, make no provision for
the non-disclosure of the information requested.
Rule 11 and Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure establish procedures for raising claims of frivolous
lawsuits and appropriate sanctions, as well as striking
frivolous defenses and scandalous matters.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As a state agency, the UTAH STATE BAR is required to
comply with the Archives and Records Services and Information Practices Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq. (1953
as amended), and the Public and Private Writings Act, Ut.
Code Ann. §§ 78-26-1 et seq (1953 as amended), as interpreted by Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1980).

The

defendants declined to do so and refused to provide the
plaintiff with the amount of salaries paid to employees of
the UTAH STATE BAR.
The plaintiff sued to get the information.

The defen-

dants answered refusing to provide the information and
claimed the statutes did not apply to them and alleged that
plaintiff improperly and unethically filed his lawsuit.

The

trial court found merit in the action, agreed with the
plaintiff's contentions and granted the relief sought.
Defendants appealed that decision.
The trial court also declined to award attorney fees
and exemplary damages.
rulings.

The plaintiff cross-appealed those

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

BRIAN M. BARNARD is an adult citizen and resident

of the State of Utah and an attorney admitted to practice
before this Court.

He maintains an office at 214 East Fifth

South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

(T.R. 22; Plaintiff's

Aff. 1 1)
2.

The UTAH STATE BAR is a governmental entity created

as an administrative agency of the Utah Supreme Court for
the purposes, among other things, of supervising the conduct
of attorneys in the State of Utah and serving the legal
profession in the State of Utah.

The UTAH STATE BAR, as a

governmental entity, was created in 1931 by state law, Ut.
Code Ann. §§ 78-51-1 et seq. (1953 as amended), and perpetiiated and re-created in 1981 by an administrative rule of
this Court (Rules for Integration and Management of the UTAH
STATE BAR, adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, effective July
1, 1981).

Suit against the UTAH STATE BAR is authorized by

Rule (A) 1. of those Rules.
3.

(T.R. 143-146)

STEPHEN HUTCHINSON is the Executive Director of the

UTAH STATE BAR, and was selected and employed by the UTAH
STATE BAR Commission to manage and handle the day-to-day
executive duties of the UTAH STATE BAR and is the agent,
servant and employee of the UTAH STATE BAR.

At all times

pertinent to this action STEPHEN HUTCHINSON was acting under
the direct supervision of the Board of Commissioners of the
UTAH STATE BAR.

At all times pertinent to this action

STEPHEN HUTCHINSON had the duty and responsibility of
enforcing the policies of the UTAH STATE BAR with regard to
the policies of the defendants.
4.

(T.R. 48; Answer, 1 II)

The plaintiff, BRIAN M. BARNARD, has been a dues

paying member of the UTAH STATE BAR in good standing since
1971.

(T.R. 23; Plaintiff's Aff. 1 2)
5.

The plaintiff, BRIAN M. BARNARD, is required, in

order to be a member of the UTAH STATE BAR and to practice
law in the State of Utah, to pay certain dues to the UTAH
STATE BAR.
6.

(T.R. 23; Plaintiff's Aff. 1 3)

The plaintiff's paid mandatory dues, along with the

dues of all other members of the UTAH STATE BAR, are used to
pay the wages and salaries of executives, administrators and
employees of the UTAH STATE BAR. (T.R. 23; Plaintiff's Aff.
1 4)
7.

The plaintiff mailed a letter to STEPHEN

HUTCHINSON, dated November 6, 1987, inquiring as to the
wages, salaries and benefits paid to certain employees of
the UTAH STATE BAR.

A copy of that letter is attached to

plaintiff's complaint and marked Exhibit "L".
Plaintiff's Aff. 1 5 )
8.

(T.R. 23;

(See Appendix)

The defendant STEPHEN HUTCHINSON in a letter to

plaintiff, dated December 9, 1987, responded to the plaintiff's letter by declining to provide specific information
as to the wages, salaries and benefits paid to employees of
the UTAH STATE BAR.

A copy of that letter is attached to

plaintiff's complaint and marked Exhibit "M".

Hutchinson

provided only salary ranges paid to "Executives," "Administrators" and "Support Staff."

(T.R. 24; Plaintiff's Aff. If

6)
9.

The plaintiff wrote a follow-up letter dated

December 11, 1987 (a copy of that letter is attached to
plaintiff's complaint and marked Exhibit "N-l"), to the
defendants again requesting specific salary information and
referring to similar information that was provided to the
plaintiff in 1980 (See Exhibit "N-2" and "N-3" attached to
plaintiff's complaint.)

(T.R. 24; Plaintiff's Aff. 1 7)

(See Appendix)
10.

The defendant, STEPHEN HUTCHINSON, responded to

the plaintiff's follow-up inquiry of December 11, 1987 by a
letter again declining to provide plaintiff with the specific information requested.
tiff's complaint.
11.

Exhibit "0" attached to plain-

(T.R. 24; Plaintiff's Aff. 1 8).

The defendants in their Answer to plaintiff's

Complaint, Fifth Affirmative Defense (T.R. pp. 49-50)
recite:
Plaintiff has brought this action for
the purpose of harassing the Defendants
in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
No facts have been presented to support such a claim.
passim).

(T.R.

That claim is without merit and was improperly

raised as a defense.

That claim should be striken as

impertinent and scandalous and as improperly asserted.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As a state agency, the UTAH STATE BAR must comply with
the provisions of Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq and
§§ 78-26-1 et seq (1953 as amended) regarding wage and
salary information of its employees.

Those statutes do not

unconstitutionally infringe on the functioning of the UTAH
STATE BAR.
No rules of the UTAH STATE BAR or this Court prohibit
release of the information.
The plaintiff, as a member of the legal profession and
the public, is entitled to declaratory relief and permanent
injunctive relief against the defendants, requiring compliance and the disclosure of salary information of UTAH STATE
BAR employees.
The plaintiff should be awarded, pursuant to Ut. Code
Ann. § 63-2-88 (2) (1953 as amended), exemplary damages for
the defendants1 willful violation of Ut. Code Ann.
§§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended).

The plaintiff must be

awarded attorney fees pursuant to the provisions of Ut. Code
Ann. § 63-2-88 (1) (1953 as amended).
The Fifth Affirmative Defense of the defendants should
be striken as impertinent and scandalous in addition to
being an insufficient defense.

ARGUMENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
A summary judgment is mandated when no material issues
of fact are in dispute and the case involves solely
questions of law.
dure.

Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-

This case was properly resolved by the lower Court

upon an application of law to uncontested and undisputed
facts.
The controlling judicial authority in this case is
Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1980).

That case

involved a request for salary information regarding employees of Weber State College by an editor of the college
newspaper.

This Court ruled that members of the tax paying

public were entitled to access to salary information regarding such government employees.

The same interpretation and

result is required in this case.

I.
THE UTAH STATE BAR IS
A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY.
The UTAH STATE BAR is a state agency and governmental
entity created by statute and/or by rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.

Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-51-1 et seq. (1953 as

amended); Rules for Integration and Management of the UTAH
STATE BAR, adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, effective July
1, 1981. The statute creating the UTAH STATE BAR and the

Utah Supreme Court Rules creating the UTAH STATE BAR speak
as to the nature of the Bar. *
Whatever it is, the UTAH STATE BAR is involuntary in
its membership requirement as a result of judicial and
legislative action.

The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah

Legislature make membership in the UTAH STATE BAR compulsory
for anyone wishing to practice law in Utah.

(Rules for

Integration, (A) § 1 & § 3; (C) § 20, July 1, 1981; Ut. Code
Ann. § 78-51-25 (1953 as amended).

* An interesting and thorough academic study, funded by the
American Bar Foundation, on the nature of integrated or
unified state bars is found in their research journal ("The
Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept," American Bar
Foundation Research Journal, 1983, Vol. 1, pp. 1-108). That
article considers the three conflicting, incoherent and
chameleon-like natures of unified bars -- public agency vs.
compulsory membership organization vs. private voluntary
association. The article concludes that unified bars should
be terminated in favor of a combination of private voluntary
state bar associations and administrative agencies independent of the organized bar. "Perceived as the equivalent of
a private voluntary association, a state bar has a strong
claim to freedom from government intervention. Yet as a
public agency a state bar must be held accountable for its
actions to the public at large. And as a compulsory membership organization it is also subject to external scrutiny,
but scrutiny on behalf of its own captive members rather
than the broader public." Id., 108.
Defendants, in passing, characterize the UTAH STATE BAR
in four (4) different manners: -- a non-profit unincorporated organization (Defendants' Brief, p. 3; p. 6); - - a
private organization (Defendants1 Brief, p. 4; p. 6; p. 10)
an arm of the Supreme Court, an arm of the judiciary
(Defendants1 Brief, p. 11; p. 14); and, -- an unincorporated association (Defendants1 Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, If 4; T.R.
105). Defendants make no attempt to reconcile the conflicting nature of unified bars or the differing obligations
dependent on the characterization.

All of the powers granted to the UTAH STATE BAR come
either from the state legislature or from the state judicia
ry.

Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-51-1 et seq. (1953 as amended);

Rules for Integration and Management of the UTAH STATE BAR,
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, effective July 1, 1981).
Thus, the UTAH STATE BAR is a state agency.
The UTAH STATE BAR has governmental powers including
the delegated power to ntax" attorneys by way of annual
dues, and the power to regulate the legal profession. Ut.
Code Ann. § 78-51-21 (1953 as amended); Rules of Integration, (A) § 1; (C) § 16, July 1, 1981. Those powers do
not come from some voluntary association of lawyers.

The

UTAH STATE BAR is an adjunct and agent of the Utah Supreme
Court.

The UTAH STATE BAR is granted the power to regulate

and prohibit the practice of law through admission and
discipline of attorneys, a governmental power.
The UTAH STATE BAR cannot exercise powers (and has no
powers) beyond those which were granted to it either by the
Legislature or the Supreme Court.**
** The UTAH STATE BAR is apparently performing functions
beyond the supervision of the Utah Supreme Court and not
authorized by this Court; (Defendants1 Brief, p. 4; p. 7;
T.R. 102-103); engaging "in numerous other activities not
connected with the admission or discipline of Bar members
which are not in any way governed, regulated or supervised
by the supreme court. These activities include the
semi-annual Bar meetings, various educational courses and
seminars, a Newsletter and the Law and Justice Center in
Salt Lake City.n (T.R. 102-103; Aff. of Hutchinson, April
14, 1988, f 6, pp. 2-3) By exceeding its authority, the
UTAH STATE BAR does not somehow gain powers beyond those
legally granted to it, and does not become a private group
not accountable to its members and the public.

The UTAH STATE BAR has no independent existence as a
"corporation" or "partnership" other than as created by the
Supreme Court and the Legislature.

The UTAH STATE BAR makes

regular fiscal reports to the Utah Supreme Court.
T.R.

(Supp.

; Sec. Aff. of Hutchinson, September 8, 1988, pp.

3-4, 1 2 - 1 3). All activities of the UTAH STATE BAR are
under the direct control and direction of the Utah Supreme
Court; according to defendant Stephen Hutchinson "the Bar,
in all its activities and functions, is under the Court's
direction and control.

...

As to all activities, . . .

the Court retains ultimate control.

It is my understanding

that the Utah Supreme Court could at any time exercise its
authority and terminate any specific activity of the Bar or
terminate the existence of the Bar itself.

I consider the

Utah State Bar to be competely subservient to and accountable to the Utah Supreme Court."

(Supp. T.R.

; Sec.

Aff. of Hutchinson, September 8, 1988, p. 4, % 3).
Although the UTAH STATE BAR can own real property, can
be sued and can sue and has other powers (Defendants1 Brief,
p. 6), the defendants cite no authority for their suggestion
that this makes the UTAH STATE BAR a non-state agency.
Similarly, although the UTAH STATE BAR may pay property
taxes and its employees may not be considered employees of
the State of Utah, defendants cite no authority for their
belief that this makes the UTAH STATE BAR a non-state
agency.

(Defendants1 Brief, p. 7),

The UTAH STATE BAR is not a public corporation like the
Utah Technology Finance Corporation, and the decision
involving the Finance Corporation, (Utah Technology Finance
Corporation v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 (Utah 1986), is not
applicable to the case at bar (Defendants' Brief, p. 8);
further, and contrary to the defendants' assertion, that
case did not broadly hold the Corporation was not a state
agency.

It only acknowledged its governmental ties and

creation as a "public" non-profit corporation.

That case

also did not involve the Archives and Records Services and
Information Practices Act.
No court, person or entity has ever declared the UTAH
STATE BAR was not a state agency.

(Defendants' Brief, p.

6).
This Court has the inherent power to regulate attorneys
(admissions, practice & discipline) (Defendants' Brief, p.
7; p. 9) (In re:
(Utah 1982).
Constitution.

Utah State Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991

Specific power to do so is granted by the Utah
Art. VIII, § 4.

The Court requires that a

person be admitted to practice before the Utah Supreme Court
in order to practice law in the State of Utah.

The Utah

Supreme Court, however, has extended itself beyond simply
admitting attorneys to practice law and also requires, under
penalty of prohibition of practice, that ail attorneys be
members of the UTAH STATE BAR.
The ability of the UTAH STATE BAR to be self-governing
(Defendants' Brief, p. 7) is based upon exacting

prescriptions from the Utah Supreme Court.

The entire

structure of the UTAH STATE BAR was established either by a
Utah Supreme Court Rule or the Utah Legislature.

That

includes the powers of the Commissioners, their election and
number, the right of the UTAH STATE BAR to hold and own
property, qualifications to serve as a Commissioner, procedure for election of Commissioners, requiring annual meetings, the terms of service of Commissioners, granting the
Commissioners the power to hire employees, specifying how
Commissioners shall administer discipline, etc.

Rules for

Integration & Management of the UTAH STATE BAR, effective
July 1, 1981. The UTAH STATE BAR was created in detail by
two (2) governmental entities for the specific governmental
purpose of regulating lawyers.
The Supreme Court did not delegate powers to just any
group (or to just any selected individual attorneys), the
Supreme Court delegated the powers to an entity which it
created.

The Supreme Court can alter the power granted and

completely control the UTAH STATE BAR through its rule
making powers.
agency.

For these reasons UTAH STATE BAR is a state

Delegation of Authority to An Agent
The power to discipline and admit attorneys are powers
delegated to the UTAH STATE BAR by the Utah Supreme Court.
(Defendants' Brief, p. 9).
The defendants on appeal now say:
The fact that the [Utah] Supreme Court has chosen
to delegate certain responsibilities with respect
to the admission and discipline of the members of
the Bar to the Bar itself. . . does not mean that
the Bar itself is somehow transformed into a state
agency for all purposes. [emphasis added]
(Defendants1 Brief, p. 10)
In the trial court, defendants said strongly and
unequivocally:
The fact that the supreme court has chosen to
delegate certain responsibilities with respect to
the admission and discipline of its members to the
Bar itself does not somehow transform the Bar into
a state agency.
(T.Pw 110; Defendants1 Memo in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Summary Judgment Motion, p. 7)
Into what does such a delegation transform the UTAH STATE
BAR?

A simple application of the principles of master /

servant and principal / agent law indicates that delegation
of authority creates an agency.

The Utah Supreme Court has

some inherent responsibilities (like admitting attorneys to
practice) and essentially says, "Let's have someone else do
that for us, we're just too busy."

There is no question

that the person chosen is an agent of the Supreme Court.
The same conclusion follows when the Supreme Court gives
authority to the UTAH STATE BAR (even pretending that the

UTAH STATE BAR had not been created by the Utah Supreme
Court),

The UTAH STATE BAR, acting for the Supreme Court,

is a state agency.
Assuming, as the defendants now suggest, that the UTAH
STATE BAR is not a state agency for all purposes (DefendantsT Brief, p. 10), the defendants must concede that some
disclosure under the Information Practices Act is required
regarding some functions of the UTAH STATE BAR but not
required as to other functions.

The defendants make no

suggestion as to when the Bar is or is not a state agency
and when disclosure is or is not required.
Since the source of power of the UTAH STATE BAR is
either a legislative or judicial enactment, plaintiff
suggests that for all. purposes the UTAH STATE BAR is a state
agency.
The Utah Supreme Court, itself, is a state agency
covered by the Archives and Records Services and Information
Practices Act because it is a "unit" "however designated,"
of the state, created by the Utah Constitution, and it is
required to comply with the Act.

The Supreme Court could

not evade its responsibility to comply with the Act by
delegating authority or creating a new entity to serve the
bidding of the Court.*

* Defendants suggest that if the UTAH STATE BAR is really a
state agency then compliance with the Governmental Immunity
Act (Ut. Code Ann. § 63-30-11 and § 63-30-12 (1953 as
amended)) was required in this case. That is incorrect
because a separate cause of action is created by the Utah
Information Practices Act which does not require any notice

II.
THE ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICES and
INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT
APPLIES TO THE UTAH STATE BAR
The Archives and Records Services and Information
Practices Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as
amended), applies to "public records" maintained by public
offices, agencies and institutions of the state of Utah,
including the UTAH STATE BAR.

See definition of public

office or state agency contained in Ut. Code Ann. §
63-2-61(2) (1953 as amended).

UTAH STATE BAR officers are

public officials under the Archives and Records Services and
Information Act and wage information as to employees of the
UTAH STATE BAR constitute public records under that act.
Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-61 (1) & (10) (1953 as amended).
Because information as to salaries paid employees of
state agencies and institutions is "public data" and available for public inspection, Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-61 (1) &
(10) (1953 as amended); Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193,
1194 (Utah 1980); Minutes of State Records Committee, July
28, 1977 cited by Redding, wage and salary information of
UTAH STATE BAR employees is "public data" and must be
available to the public.

The UTAH STATE BAR must comply

with the provisions of Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953
as amended) regarding wage and salary information of its
staff, and its failure to provide the plaintiff with specific salary information concerning its staff violates Ut. Code
Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended).

The applicability of the Archives and Records Services
and Information Practices Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et
seq (1953 as amended), to the defendants is clear from a
reading of the Act.

That statute (§ 63-2-61(2)) defines a

"state agency" very broadly as a department, division,
board, bureau, commission, council, institution, authority,
or other unit, however designated, of the state.

The UTAH

STATE BAR, is an arm of this Court (Defendants1 Brief, p.
11; p. 14)

and a creature of the state, and therefore is a

"unit" of the state "however designated."
The Information Practice Act (§ 63-2-61(3)) defines
"public offices" and "public officers" to mean, respectively, the offices and officers of any court, commission or
other agency of the state.

Contrary to the absurd sug-

gestion of the defendants (Defendantsr Brief, p. 10), the
plaintiff does not want this Court to interpret the term
"officers of any court" to mean all attorneys; the logical
reading of that provision covers the clerks of a court, the
administrators of a court, the secretarial employees of a
court, and paid functionaries of a court, etc.

This reading

follows from the broad definition of "state agency"
(§ 63-2-61(2)) and is consistent with the statute
(§ 63-2-79) which specifically authorizes the state
archivist to assist the judicial branch of state government
with regard to records-management programs and the provision
of program services under the Act.

Redding v. Brady
The defendants say that Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193
(Utah 1980), does not apply because Weber State College was
clearly a ffpublic institution11 since it received tax payers'
money,

(Defendants1 Brief, p. 9) Whether an entity re-

ceives tax payers1 money is one indicator as to whether it
is a "state agency," but it is not conclusive.

The R.ed

Cross and other charitable groups regularly receive tax
payers1 money, but they are not "state agencies.11 Defendants cite no authority for their suggestion (Defendants'
Brief, p. 9) that simply because the UTAH STATE BAR does not
receive public tax payer money it is not a state agency.
In Redding, Weber State College was determined to be a
state institution for reasons other than its receipt of
taxpayer money, just as the UTAH STATE BAR is a state agency
despite its non-receipt of public tax payer money.

In part,

the UTAH STATE BAR is a state agency because of its receipt
of attorney "taxes" in the form of state mandated fees.
Weber State College was and is a "public institution"
because it was created and perpetuated by enactment of the
Utah Legislature, Ut. Code Ann. § 53B-2-101 (1953 as amended), just like the UTAH STATE BAR.

And just like the UTAH

STATE BAR, Weber State College serves a governmentally
mandated function:
ing attorneys.

providing higher education vs. regulat-

The UTAH STATE BAR like Weber State College

is a state agency for many reasons other than just receiving
and spending tax money.

Privacy v. Public's Right to Know
This Court acknowledged in Redding v. Brady, that there
is a "right to privacy11 in Utah.
1195.

Redding, 606 P. 2d 1193,

That right however is limited to items of very

personal nature and is determined

ff

by applying the commonly

accepted standards of social propriety.11

Id. , 1195. This

Court then weighed that right to privacy of the employees of
Weber State College against "the right of the public to know
what goes on in its public institutions.11

Id. , 1195.

Balancing the two competing interests, this Court said,
Inasmuch as the very existence of public institutions depends upon finances provided by the
public, it does not strike us as being discordant
to reason that the public would want to know, and
ought to know how their money is spent. In regard
to the defendant's expressed fears that the
exposure of such information will have an adverse
effect upon its ability to operate the College, it
seems to us that there is even a greater potential
for evil in permitting public funds to be expended
secretly. In this connection it is also to be
realized that by accepting employment at the
college its employees are not merely private
citizens, but become public servants in whose
conduct and in whose salary the public has a
legitimate interest.
Id. , 1196; See discussion:
Rev. 649, 662-664.

"Dev. In Utah Law," 1980 Ut. Law

Thus, this Court ruled that any privacy right that a
governmental employee might have against the disclosure of
the amount of her salary is outweighed by the public's right
to know how the public's money is spent.

That decision

applies to the employees of the UTAH STATE BAR who are
public servants paid with "taxes,ff in the form of mandatory
dues from Utah attorneys.
In Redding, this Court noted "the public would want to
know, and ought to know how their money is spent" (Id.,
1196).

In the case at bar we have a situation where the fee

payer, (the plaintiff and other members of the UTAH STATE
BAR), also want to know, and ought to know how his/her money
is spent.
The defendants acknowledge that "taxpayer vs. Weber
State College" in Redding is different than "Bar Member vs.
UTAH STATE BAR" in the case before the Court.

(Defendants1

Brief, p. 9). The plaintiff's position is that the facts
here are much more compelling and there are stronger reasons
for disclosure in this case than in Redding.

The almost

five thousand (4,900+) attorneys in Utah, each forced to be
a member of the UTAH STATE BAR, are "taxed" directly and
specifically to pay the salaries of the employees of the
UTAH STATE BAR.

There are fewer "tax payers" in this case

and they have a greater need to have their money accounted
for.

Additionally, the elected governing board of the UTAH

STATE BAR. are all lawyers who have a fiduciary duty owed to
the members of the UTAH STATE BAR to explicitly show that
every cent they extract from attorneys is properly spent.
This gives every Utah attorney greater reason and a more
compelling need to know how his/her money is being used.
Bar members want to know and ought to know how their money

is spent.

The UTAH STATE BAR makes regular fiscal reports

to the Utah Supreme Court.

(Supp. T.R.

; Sec. Aff. of

Hutchinson, September 8, 1988, pp. 3-4, If 2 - f 3).
Shouldn't the UTAH STATE BAR also be accountable to its
involuntary individual members who pay dues?
Once this Court determines that the UTAH STATE BAR is a
state agency, Redding applies, and the wage and salary
information requested must be provided.

III.
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WRITINGS ACT
APPLIES TO THE UTAH STATE BAR
The Public and Private Writings Act, Ut. Code Ann.
§ 78-26-2 (1953 as amended) provides in pertinent part:
Right to Inspect and Copy -- Every citizen
has a right to inspect and take a copy of any
public writing of this state except as
otherwise expressly provided by statute.
The UTAH STATE BAR must comply with the Public and Private
Writings Act by divulging to the plaintiff wage and salary
information concerning its staff.

The plaintiff does not

seek any personally identifiable financial information such
as tax withholding information, number of dependents, etc.
but only the gross salaries and fringe benefits provided to
employees of the UTAH STATE BAR.
The defendants concede that if the UTAH STATE BAR is a
state agency the Utah Public and Private Writings Act

applies and disclosure of the information requested by
plaintiff is mandated.

(Defendants1 Brief, p. 6)

As set forth above, the UTAH STATE BAR is a state
agency and, therefore, the defendants violated the Public
and Private Writings Act by refusing to provide the plaintiff with specific salary information for employees of the
UTAH STATE BAR.

IV.
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED
TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
The plaintiff is entitled to exemplary damages for the
above described violation, pursuant to Ut. Code Ann.
§ 63-2-88 (2) (1953 as amended).**

The defendants refusal

to provide the requested information is a willful violation
of Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended).
The Utah legislature mandates exemplary damages be
awarded for violations of a member of the public's right to
access to "public data."

The defendants1 conduct herein is

the type of violation the legislature intended to punish.
The UTAH STATE BAR, of all public entities in the state
of Utah acting as an arm of this Court serving a constitutionally mandated function, should be concerned with conply-

** A violation of the Archives and Records Services and
Information Practices Act is serious mis-conduct. The Act
provides for criminal sanctions and declares a violation of
the act a class B misdemeanor, and providing that a public
employee who willfully violates the act is subject to
suspension without pay or discharge. Ut. Code Ann.
§ 63-2-87 (1953 as amended).

ing with the law and remaining open to the public.

Its

willful refusal to comply with Utah laws designed to insure
lawful and open conduct, justifies imposition of punitive
damages as allowed by law.
The District Court's ruling simply recited in a
conclusory fashion that the defendants' violation of the
Information Practices Act was not willful.
Summary Judgment, May 9, 1988, p. 2)

(T.R. 143-146;

That finding was made

on the basis of affidavits which showed the defendants did
not comply with the statute solely because of their interpretation that the law was not applicable to them; clearly,
the process of making that interpretation was willful. The
lack of adequate findings of fact regarding the willful
nature of the defendants' conduct and exemplary damages
precludes an adequate review by this Court.

V.
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED
TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES
The plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees and is
entitled to re-imbursement thereof pursuant to the provisions of Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (1) (1953 as amended).
Re-imbursement for fees does not require, as does an
award of exemplary damages, a willful violation of the
Archives and Records Services and Information Practices Act.
Thus, even for non-willful violations of the Act, the
plaintiff is entitled to re-imbursement for attorney's fees.

The trial court, although finding in favor of plaintiff, refused to award attorney fees as per Utah Code Ann. §
63-2-88(1) (1953 as amended).

That statute states in

pertinent part:
Any responsible authority who violates any provision of
this act shall be liable to any person, suffering
damage as a result thereof, and the person damaged nay
bring an action to recover any damages . . . and
reasonable attorney fees." [emphasis added] Id.
The import of the statutory language is that the
violating authority will be liable for attorney fees to the
person damaged by the violation of the statute.

The use of

the word shall leaves no room for discretion as to whether
liability exists as to attorney fees.

If the statute is

violated there is liability as to attorney fees, as well as
costs and damages.

The fact that plaintiff exercised his

right and brought an action against the Bar and the fact
that the Bar was found to be in violation of the statute
necessarily requires an award of attorney fees.
Inasmuch as the language of the statute allows no
discretion to the trial court concerning the award of fees,
a refusal to award them must be accompanied by findings
explaining the court's reasons and basis for not following
the law.

Futhermore, if the award of attorney fees were a

question of fact and an exercise of discretion by the trial
court, in order to examine that discretion, findings of fact
from the trial court are necessary.

This court must find

the trial court's decision to deny fees erroneous since it
is contrary to law and is unaccompanied by findings.

This Court should remand this matter with instructions
to award attorney fees as required by statute.
VI.
DEFENDANTS1 ARGUMENT RE: UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE STATUTES SHOULD BE IGNORED
Defendants1 Brief (pp. 1 1 - 1 4 ) suggests that the
statutes, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended)
and Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-26-1 et seq (1953 as amended) which
formed the basis of the decision of the Court below, cannot
be constitutionally applied to the UTAH STATE BAR.

The gist

of that argument is that the UTAH STATE BAR is an arm of the
Utah Supreme Court and, under the separation of powers
provisions of the Utah Constitution, the legislature cannot,
through statutes, tell the Utah Supreme Court, and its
agent, the UTAH STATE BAR, how to conduct its functions.
This argument appears for the first time in the Appellants1 Brief (§ II, p. 2, % 2) in the STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

This claim and argument is not

mentioned in the Issues on Appeal portion (K 5) of the
defendants-appellants' Docketing Statement (May 26, 1988).
The argument was not raised in the defendants-appellants1
Memorandum (dated April 14, 1988) in Opposition to the
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment before the lower
court.

T.R. 104-111

The argument was not raised in the

defendants-appellants' Answer (dated February 29, 1988).
T.R. 48-50

At no time while this action was before the

District Court was the claim or argument of "unconstitu-

tionality" raised.

This claim was neither briefed nor

argued before the District Court.

Thus, the trial court was

not requested to, nor was it able to, rule on that claim and
defense.
Having failed to present this claim and argument to the
Court below, the appellants-defendants are now precluded
from presenting the argument to this Court for the first
time on appeal.

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah

App. 1987); Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Lane
v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986); Bundy v. Century
Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984); Bangerter v.
Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983).

VII.
APPLICATION OF THE INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT
AND THE PUBLIC WRITINGS ACT
TO THE UTAH STATE BAR
DOES NOT OFFEND THE CONCEPT
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
The defendants express concern that the legislature
should not be allowed, through statutes, to control what
information the UTAH STATE BAR is required to divulge since
the Bar is an arm of the judiciary and the judiciary must
not be controlled by the legislature.

In reality, the

judiciary is, in many instances, controlled by statutes.
The Bar itself was originally ordered created by the legislature, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-51-1 et seq. (1953 as amended).
The legislature has also required the courts to conduct all
proceedings in English, Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-22 (1953 as

amended); established the parameters of contempt Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-32-1 et seq. (1953 as amended); established
judicial salaries, Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-8-1 et seq. (1953 as
amended) and established the powers of every judicial
officer, Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-17 (1953 as amended),*
The effect of application of these statutes to the UTAH
STATE BAR is not so great as to offend the doctrine of
separation of powers. Application of these statutes is also
appropriate since the UTAH STATE BAR has not enacted any
rules regarding disclosure and accountability to its members , and has enacted no rules to protect the privacy
(within permissible parameters) of its employees or its
members.

Cases Cited by Defendants
In their brief defendants cite Huntsman - Christensen
Corp. v. Entrada Industries, 639 F.Supp. 733 (D.Utah 1986)
to support their contention that Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-1(2)

* The Utah legislature through numerous other statutes
exercises control over the judiciary. Some of them are:
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) §§ 78-7-1 (conflicts of
interest), 78-7-18 (power to punish contempt), 78-7-9.5
(service of a judge in another division or court), 77-35-29
(disability of judges), 77-35-29 (judicial bias or prejudice) , 78-34-8 (powers of judge concerning eminent domain),
78-7-16 (judicial powers out of court), 30-3-17 (powers and
jurisdiction of family courts), 78-7-27 (appointment of
judicial conduct committee), 78-2-1 (number of justices,
selection and functions), 78-2-2 (Supreme Court jurisdiction) , 78-7-30 (privileged nature of complaints and testimony) , 78-7-28 (involuntary retirement of judges), 20-1-7.1
(process for filling vacancies).

(1953 as amended) is limited in its scope and that it is up
to the courts to decide on a case by case basis whether the
right to information is outweighed by competing interests.
The court in Huntsman however, was dealing with formal court
documents not records of employee salaries.

Obviously there

is a great difference between court documents and records of
governmental employee salaries.

The courts should, as

stated "have discretion to seal court documents."
736.

Id. at

The case at bar has nothing to do with court docu-

ments.

The court in Huntsman noted a common law presumption

favoring public access to judicial records.

Id. at 737.

Unless there is good reason to seal files and make secret
their contents, even formal court documents should be open
to the public.

Id.

Defendants further cite Pasik v. State Board of Law
Examiners, 478 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. 1984).

The case is not

applicable here because it was decided solely on the basis
of the New York Freedom of Information Law.

That statute is

unique to New York state. An attempt to apply it in Utah is
pointless.
Finally, defendants cite, Matter of Washington State
Bar Assoc., 548 P.2d 310 (Wash. 1976) and Ex Parte Auditor
of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1980).

There are

clear distinctions between those cases and the case at bar.
In both cited cases the legislative branch was a party to a
suit against the state bar attempting to audit the bars1
records in search of malfeasance.

In the instant case,

plaintiff is an active, dues-paying member of the Bar who
simply wishes to know the salaries of the Bar employees.
This case is not an instance of one branch of state government attempting to interfere with another, it is analogous
to a taxpayer seeking information pertaining to salaries
paid to state employees.

VIII.
NO RULE PROHIBITS DISCLOSURE
Interestingly, there is no rule of the UTAH STATE BAR
or of the Utah Supreme Court which prohibits the release of
the requested salary information.

(If there was, the

defendants would have have cited it!).

Below, the defen-

dants asserted the plaintiff should have asked for the
enactment of a new administrative rule to "release" the
salary information.
DEFENSE, p. 2)

(T.R. 49; Answer, SECOND AFFIRMATIVE

The converse is true, the defendants could

enact (or could have enacted) an administrative rule
prohibiting the release.

Absent such a rule, the

information must be released.**

** The defendants have adopted no rule that allows them to
disclose salary ranges (in lieu of specific salaries for
specific employees) as they provided in the initial response
to plaintiff's request for salary information. Defendants
adopted an ad hoc practice in this regard but only after
plaintiff inquired as to the salaries.

IX.
DEFENDANTS' FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE SHOULD BE STRIKEN
The defendants1 Fifth Affirmative Defense in their
Answer (T.R. pp. 49-50) recites:
Plaintiff has brought this action for
the purpose of harassing the Defendants
in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The defendants submitted no evidence to support this
allegation/defense.
claim.

There are no facts to support such a

(T.R. passim)

This defense accuses the plaintiff, an attorney, of
unethical and/or improper conduct in three (3) regards:

A violation of former DR 7-102(A)(l)
which provided that a lawyer may not ff[f]ile
a suit. . . when he knows or when it is
obvious that such action would serve merely
to harass or maliciously injure another.1'
A violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure in filing an action not
well grounded in law or in fact and filed for
an improper purpose.
A violation of Rule 3.1 of the current
Rules of Professional Conduct in that plaintiff brought a frivolous or meritless proceeding.

Such accusations of improper conduct are inappropriate in av
answer and are exceptionally offensive when made without any
basis in fact.
In the Court below, Judge Wilkinson ruled in favor of
the plaintiff, thus determining that the action was not
frivolous.

(T.R. pp. 143-146)

Thereafter, plaintiff

requested that the defendants' counsel voluntarily strike
their Fifth Affirmative Defense, as offensive and without
merit.

They have declined to do so.

A claimed violation under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure is not a defense to be raised in an Answer.
A violation of Rule 11 should be raised by motion or upon
the court's own initiative, and may result in sanctions. To
include a request for Rule 11 sanctions in an Answer is
premature; it must await a determination, usually upon
motion of the impropriety of the pleading.

A request for

Rule 11 sanctions is not provided for in Rule 12 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure which deals with answers and
defenses.
Plaintiff requests this Court to enter an order striking defendants1 Fifth Affirmative Defense as a violation of
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Further, as

an improper and insufficient defense, and impertinent and
scandalous matter, this Court should order that Defense
striken under Rule 12(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

CONCLUSION
The UTAH STATE BAR must comply with the provisions of
Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq and §§ 78-26-1 et seq (1953
as amended) regarding wage and salary information of its
employees.

The "tax paying" members of the UTAH STATE BAR

have the right to know how and where their money is being
spent.

The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief and

permanent injunctive relief, pursuant to Ut. Code Ann.
§ 63-2-88 (3) (1953 as amended), requiring compliance with
Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq and §§ 78-26-1 et seq (1953
as amended) and the disclosure of salary and wage information of UTAH STATE BAR employees.
Application of those statutes to the UTAH STATE BAR
does not offend the doctrine of separation of powers.
No rule or regulation of the UTAH STATE BAR or of this
Court prohibits the disclosure of the requested information.
The plaintiff should be awarded, pursuant to Ut. Code
Ann. § 63-2-88 (2) (1953 as amended), exemplary damages for
the defendants' willful violation of Ut. Code Ann.
§§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended).
The plaintiff must be awarded attorney fees pursuant to
the provisions of Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (1) (1953 as
amended).
Defendants' Fifth Affirmative Defense should be
striken.

The appeal by the defendants should be denied and the
decision of the trial court should be affirmed as to the
award of summary judgment to the plaintiff.
The cross-appeal of the plaintiff should be granted and
the matter should be remanded with direction to the trial
court to award exemplary damages as well as attorney fees,
including those incurred on appeal against the defendants,

DATED this 4th day of NOVEMBER, 1988.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

by \j \Al4\\\__\ /L\K
BRIAN M. BARNARD
C. DANE NOLAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

,CU

APPENDIX
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Summary Judgment

(T.R. 143-146)

B.

Notice of Cross-Appeal

(T.R. 164-165)

C.

1987 Letter of Inquiry

(T.R. 10)

D.

1987 Follow-up Letter

(T.R. 14)

E.

1980 Response Providing
Salary Information

(T.R. 15-16)

BRIAN M. BARNARD
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C. DANE NOLAN
USB #4891
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
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Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs .

Civil No. C-88-0578
:

UTAH STATE BAR and
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON,
Defendants.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Hon. H. WILKINSON )

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court
for hearing on the Motion of the Plaintiff for Summary
Judgment and on the Motion of the Plaintiff for Judgment on
the Pleadings, the hearing being heLd pursuant to notice on
April 22, 1988 at 9:00 a.m., the Hon. Homer Wilkinson, judge
presiding, the plaintiff appearing by and through counsel,
BRIAN M. BARNARD, the defendants appearing by and through
their counsel, RICHARD BURBIDGE, the Court having reviewed
the file and the pleadings therein and having heard the
representations and arguments of respective counsel, based
thereon and for good cause appearing,

^:PU\INTIPPS^1
I ^ t P Y M l R I T ; I? I

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be and hereby
is granted; further,
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the UTAH STATE
BAR is determined to be a "state agency" as defined in, and
is subject to, the provisions of the Utah Archives and
Records Services and Information Practices Act, Ut. Code
Ann. §§ 63-2-59 (1953 as amended) and the Utah Public and
Private Writings Act, Ut. Code Ann, §§ 78-26-2 et seq (1953
as amended); the case of Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193,
(Ut. 1980) is controlling in this action; further,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief as against the
defendants pursuant, in part, to the provisions of Ut. Code
Ann. § 63-2-88 (3) (1953 as amended); further,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
defendants shall comply with the provisions of the aforesaid
:-M.:.(::;, and shall provide to the plaintiff specific wage,
sal.ary and benefit information regarding the employees of
the Utah State Bar; further,
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the refusal of
tin', defendants to comply with the Information Practices Act
was not willful and therefore the plaintiff is not entitled
to exemplary damages; further,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney fees in
this action; further,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
plaintiff should be and hereby is awarded his costs in the
sum of eighty-four dollars and ninety cents ($84.90) based
upon the plaintiff's memorandum of costs date April 22. 1988
and pursuant to Rule 54 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

DATED this _/_

4

v4A., 1988
day of JCp*i£,

BY THE COURT:

HOMER WILKINSON
JUDGE

flv -'

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
C. DANE NOLAN
USB # 4891
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111 - 3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C-88-0578
:

UTAH STATE BAR and
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE
OF CROSS APPEAL

:
(Hon. H. WILKINSON )

THE PLAINTIFF, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by and through counsel
hereby gives notice of a Cross Appeal in the above matter.
This appeal is based upon the denial of exemplary damages
against the defendants and the denial of attorney fees as
against the defendants in the ruling and summary judgment of
the Court dated and signed May 9, 1988.
The defendants have already filed a notice of appeal in
this matter dated May 18, 1988.
This appeal is to the Utah Supreme Court.
DATED this 18th day of MAY, 1988.

CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of MAY, 1988, I
caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL to:
JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE
Counsel for Defendants
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

RICHARD BURBIDGE
&
STEPHEN MITCHELL
Counsel for Defendants
139 East South Temple
# 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
CARMAN E. KIPP
&
ROBERT REES
Counsel for Defendants
175 East 400 South #300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service.

Utah Legal Clinic
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-9331 -528-9532
Attorneys
Co Dane Nolan
Brian M. Barnard

November 6, 1987

STEVE HUTCHINSON
Executive Director
Utah State Bar
A25 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Expenditures of the Utah State Bar For Salary.

Dear Mr. Hutchinson:
I would appreciate it if you could provide me with some
information with regard to the salaries paid to the various
positions at the Utah State Bar.
I noted in the Utah State Bar, 1986 annual report, an
item under expenses for "salary and personnel costs11 in the
sum of $376,461.00. The comparable figure for 1985 was
$337,498.00.
In looking back at the proposed budget for the fiscal
year 1980-1981, I noticed that the combined figures for
salaries, payroll taxes and fringe benefits was only
$158,000.00.
I would appreciate seeing how those figures for 1986
compare to the figures for 1987 and I'd like to see how
those salaried personnel costs break down for each of the
executive and major staff positions within the Bar.
I'm also very interested in what kind of fringe
benefits are being provided to the staff of the Utah State
Bar; by that I mean annual leave, sick leave, retirement,
etc.
Thank you for your cooperatiqnand a t t e n t i o

cc: Reed Martineau
T*M"R/*-1«

PLAINTIFF'S

Utah Legal Clink
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)

328-9531-328-9532

Attorneys
C. Dane Nolan

December 11f 1987

Brian M. Barnard

STEPHEN F. HUTCHINSON
Executive Director
UTAH STATE BAR
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Re:

84111

SALARY & WAGE INFORMATION
Employees of Utah State Bar

Dear Mr, Hutchinson:
Thank you for your letter of December 9, 1987.
In response to a letter I sent in 1980, (similar to my
recent request to you) I received the enclosed letter and
attachment from Barbara Bassett. As you will note she was
able to provide me with very specific information regarding
the salaries of employees of the Utah State Bar.
I would like similar information for the years 19861987 and 1987-1988.
Thank you for your assistance and cooperation.

pdq/BMB
cc:

Reed Martineau, Esq.

PLAINTIFF'S

• p y u m i T ;:&•

Carman E. Kipp

UTAH STATE BAR

President
GOO Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84U1
521-3773

4 2 5 EAST FIRST SOUTH

President Elect
90 West 100 North
Price. Utah 84501
637-1245

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

Duane A. Frandsen
84111

Dean W. Sheffield

Executive Director
425 East 100 South
Sail Lake City, Utah S4U1
531-9077

July 14, 1980

Mr. Brian M. Barnard, Esq,
214 East 500 So.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Commissioners
Stephen Ho Anderson
Brian R. Florence
M. Dayle Jeffs
Norman S, Johnson
O. Wood Moyle III
Gordon L. Roberts
David W. Sorenson

Dear Brian
Enclosed is the salary information you requested on employees of
the State Bar Office.
If you have any questions, or I may be of further assistance, please
call.

irbara R. Bassett

BRBfljc

f

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

1

UTAH STATE BAR
SALARY SCHEDULE

TITLE
Executive

Director

MONTHLY

YEARLY

3,210.00

38,520.00

Assistant to Executive

Director

925.00

11,100.00

Secretary t o Executive

Director

850.00

10,200.00

1,666.66

19,999.92

Secretary to Bar Counsel

925.00

11,100.00

Bookkeeper/Licensing Clerk

400.00

4,800.00

Lawyer R e f e r r a l

750.00

9,000.00

700.00

8,400.00

4.50/hr.

8,640.00

Bar Counsel

Receptionist
Mail Room Clerk

Clerk

121,759.92

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of NOVEMBER, 1988,
I caused to be mailed two (2) copies of the above and
foregoing pleading BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT and RESPONDENT
to each of the following:
CARMAN E. KIPP, Esq.
ROBERT H. REES, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants
and Cross-Respondents
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

# 300
84111

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq.
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants
and Cross-Respondents
139 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

# 2001
84111

JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE
Attorney for Defendants
and Cross-Respondents
425 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

and

counsel for the opposing parties, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Cross-Appellant &
Respondeat

by yVVaW^^-X jfRx.
C. DANE NOLAN

